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PRO DEo ET PATRIA: THE GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH
AND UKRAINIAN NATIONAL LIFE - PAST AND PRESENT

BRETT R. MCCAW'
In the early months of 2014, global attention turned to the streets of
Kyiv as the most pressing crisis in post-Soviet Ukraine unraveled in the
course of weeks. What originated as an incidental political protest against
president Viktor Yanukovych's last minute reneging of a long-awaited
European Association agreement, soon developed into a mass movement on
Kyiv's Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) with ramifications for
the entire country. As tensions escalated between protestors and riot police,
stirring images of Ukrainian priests in the midst of such confrontations
offered Western audiences a noteworthy paradox of the formerly atheistic
Soviet republic's strikingly religious civil society.
Once considered as the USSR's equivalent 'Bible Belt," 2 Ukraine is
one of the most religiously pluralistic, if at times confusing, countries in
Europe. Though predominated by Eastern Orthodoxy, of which there are
three different churches (Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate
UOC-MP, Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate UOC-KP, and
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church UAOC); Ukraine also has
sizable Protestant and Catholic minorities. Yet among the most remarkable
and dynamic of religious institutions in post-Soviet Ukraine, the Ukrainian
Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) maintains a pride of place. As an
institution that lies on Christendom's traditional fault line between

1. Brett R. McCaw is a freelance scholar and writer with a BA in Philosophy and Catholic
Studies (University of St. Thomas) and a MA in International Politics (Marquette University).
McCaw has taught in Ukraine and worked in the country's NGO sector for several years and was
present on Kyiv's Euromaidan in January and May of 2014 as a journalist to observe events.
*Special thanks to the personnel of the Ukrainian National Museum in Chicago (IL) -especially to
curator Ms. Maria Klimchak for her generous help to me in navigating the museum's archives.
Special thanks also to Ms. Nelia Martsinkiv, a talented Ukrainian historian and doctoral student at
the University of Notre Dame, who assisted in questions relating to my Ukrainian translations as
well as historical clarifications.
2. SERHII PLOKHY, THE LAST EMPIRE: THE FINAL DAYS OF THE SOVIET UNION 286
(2014).
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Byzantium and Rome, the UGCC embraces an Orthodox liturgical tradition
and ecclesial structure while remaining loyal to the Holy See of Rome.
With around five million members in Ukraine and around the world, it is
the largest of the Eastern Catholic Churches. As one of the foremost victims
of Stalinist repression, the UGCC nonetheless became a primary symbol of
silent resistance to the Soviet regime only to re-emerge from its catacombs
in 1989 and epitomize newly-independent
Ukraine's religious
risorgimento.

Yet, beyond its 20h century experience, the UGCC's connection to
national consciousness goes back centuries. Ever dependent on the
historical contingencies related to the seemingly endless re-tracing of geopolitical borders of Eastern and Central Europe from the 1 8th through the
20th centuries, the UGCC has subsequently forged for itself an intensely
close bond to the identity and fate of the Ukrainian people. On account of
this, it is goal of this paper to more closely consider the privileged role of
the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church within the development of Ukrainian
national consciousness throughout its history, so as to better understand its
continued impact within contemporary Ukrainian national life. Namely,
how a Church that makes up no more than 10% of Ukraine's contemporary
population can still maintain its role as the nation's foremost 'repository of
national culture and memory'.3
In asserting its Byzantine Christian identity, the Ukrainian Greek
Catholic Church, along with the Russian and other Ukrainian Orthodox
churches, traces its roots to the original Kyivan Church-first established
with the 'Baptism of Rus' at the behest of the leader of the Kyiv-Rus
principality, prince Vladimir in 988. With the eventual absorption of much
of Kyiv-Rus' territory into the predominantly Roman Catholic PolishLithuanian Commonwealth by the end of the 14th century and the gradual
rise of Muscovy to the east in the 16th century, the Church of Kyiv
gradually lost prominence and went into significant institutional decay in
the subsequent centuries. The social and religious tumult of the 16th
century posed both significant challenges and opportunities for the bishops
of the Kyivan (or 'Ruthenian') Church. In the century following the fall of
Constantinople in 1453-an event that stood as the effective de-capitation
of the Byzantine Orthodox world, the Church of Kyiv was in dire straits
with a decrepit institutional structure, intellectually and morally backward
clergy, and a lack of effective resources for reform.4
As aftershocks of the Protestant Reformation ruminated across the
continent, a strong appeal of Calvinism among Polish-Lithuanian elites as
well as the aggressive Catholic counter-offensive led by the Jesuits, most

3.
George Weigel, Troubles in Ukraine, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (May 26, 2010),
http://www.na tionalreview.com/article/229829/troubles-ukraine-george-weigel.
4.
BORYS A. GUDZIAK, CRISIS AND REFORM: THE KYIVAN METROPOLITANATE, THE
PATRIARCHATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE, AND THE GENESIS OF THE UNION OF BREST 63-65 (2001).
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notably the Polish Fr. Piotr Skarga SJ, confronted the Kyivan Bishops with
the existential dilemma of either losing the mass of their uneducated lower
clergy and flock to Protestantism or eventually being entirely over-run by
the forces of counter-reformation Catholicism, which implied a full-scale
incorporation into the Latin-rite Church of the Poles.' Desirous to secure
the future for their Church as well as duly impressed by the vitality of
Counter-Reformation Catholicism in the West, the Bishops of the Kyivan
Church, along with authorities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,
entered into the Union of Brest (1595) which subsequently confirmed their
Church's full communion with the Pope of Rome.6 While promising
obedience to the Roman See, the Brest Union nevertheless allowed the
Kyivan Church to maintain its Eastern Christian tradition in such practices
as married clergy, preservation of distinctive Eastern liturgical ritual,
equality with the Latin Church, and the establishment of its own
institutions.'

While there were expectations for improved political status from the
union with Rome, the lot of the Kyivan (or 'Ruthenian') Church did not
improve under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Despite a formal
blessing from Rome, neither Polish elites nor Polish ecclesial leadership
had any intention of raising the dignity of the Ruthenian Church as co-equal
with that of the Polish Roman Catholic Church. With the partition of
Poland at the end of the 18th century, the Ruthenian Church would be split
between newly-acquired Austrian and Russian territories. The partition in
particular would determine the religious geography and development of
what would become known as the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church to the
present. For the Ruthenian Church on Russian territory, Czarist authorities
enacted waves of forced conversions to Russian Orthodoxy that eventually
snuffed out eastern-rite Catholicism on its territory. Fierce animosity
toward 'Uniate apostasy' on the part of Russian civil and ecclesial leaders
as well as suspicion of the Uniate Church as an obstacle to effective
Russification of the population motivated such repressions.9
However, the experience of the Ruthenian Church within the Austrian
crownland was quite the opposite. The period of Austrian rule was a
significant turning point for the Ruthenian Church and, by extension, what

5.
6.
7.

Id. at 79-85.
Id. at 233-235.
Articles of the Union of Brest (Articles 9; 3,4,6, 22; 12, 16, 30; & 27 respectively), in

BORYS A. GUDZIAK, CRISIS AND REFORM: THE KYIVAN METROPOLITANATE, THE
PATRIARCHATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE, AND THE GENESIS OF THE UNION OF BREST 63-65 (2001).
8. BARBARA SKINNER WESTERN FRONT OF THE EASTERN CHURCH: UNIATE AND
ORTHODOX CONFLICT IN 18TH CENTURY POLAND, UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND RUSSIA 32 (2009).
9. BOHDAN R. BOCIURKIW, THE UKRAINIAN GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE SOVIET
STATE (1939-1950) 4 (1996). The term 'Uniate' is frequently used within Russian Orthodox

circles to denote those Eastern Christians that follow the 'union' with Rome. For many Ukrainian
Greek Catholics, it is considered a derogatory term. Id.
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would become the nascent Ukrainian national movement. In contrast to the
Poles, the Austrian government officially recognized the Ruthenian Church
as equal in status with the Latin Church of the Austrians and the Polesgranting its contemporary nomenklature
'Greek Catholic Church'
(Griechisch Katolische Kirche) to imply such equality.10
Vienna's
favorable disposition toward the Greek Catholics was part and parcel with
further reforms to improve the welfare of Ukrainians in general-such as,
most notably, the emancipation of Serfdom in 1848.11
Of all of these reforms relating to the Church, the systematization of
theological education for Greek Catholic Clergy proved to be most
consequential. Priests who would have ordinarily received informal
education from their fathers (the practice of married priesthood often made
the clerical life a hereditary profession),1 2 now became beneficiaries of
Austrian education at seminaries located in Vienna and Lemberg (L'viv)
established by the Habsburg government specifically for the formation of
Greek Catholic clergy.13 Greek Catholic clergy soon emerged, along with
their families, as the first example of an educated elite class within the
overwhelmingly landed, peasant Ruthenian (previous ethnic nomenclature
of Ukrainian) community.1 4 In addition to their pastoral duties, new
generations of classically educated Greek Catholic clergy assumed the roles
of educator, ethnic historian, social worker, and political activist-thus
becoming some of the first initiators of the Ukrainian national movement in
the mid-19th century." These Greek Catholic clergy and their families by
extension would remain as the educated elites within Eastern Galicia until
the end of the 19th century after which the explicitly clerical influence
within the national movement would recede and make way for a national
movement that was more secular, if not at times, anti-clerical.1 6 Despite
this, the Ukrainian national project at this time would maintain the former
shadow of its clerical identity as many later secular activists were,
ironically, children of clerical families.1 7

10.

John-Paul Himka, The Greek Catholic Church and the UkrainianNation in Galicia, in

RELIGIOUS COMPROMISE, POLITICAL SALVATION: THE GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH AND NATIONBUILDING IN EASTERN EUROPE 9 (John-Paul Himka, James T. Flynn & James Niessen eds.,

1993).
11.

Id. at 11.

12.
SKINNER, supra note 8, at 65.
13.
Wolfdieter Bihl, Sheptyts'kyi and the Austrian Government, in MORALITY AND
REALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDREI SHEPTYTS'KYI 16 (Paul R. Magocsi ed.,1989).
14.
John-Paul Hinika, Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic
Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867-1900, Montreal: McGill-Queens

U. Press 116 (1999).
15.
Hinika, supra note 10, at 10.
16.
ANDRII KRAWCHUK, CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHICS IN UKRAINE: THE LEGACY OF ANDREI
SHEPTYTSKY 21-22 (1997).
17.
John-Paul, Himka, Sheptyts'kyi and the UkrainianNational Movement before 1914, in
MORALITY AND REALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDREI SHEPTYTS'KYI 35 (Paul R. Magocsi
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The pinnacle of the Greek Catholic Church's contribution to the
Ukrainian national movement came in the remarkable life and work of
Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky (1865-1944), who led the Church from
1901 to 1944. Born Roman Alexander Maria Sheptytsky on July 29, 1865
into an aristocratic, Polonized family with Ukrainian roots, young
Sheptytsky first sought careers in the Austro-Hungarian army and later Law
in accord with his father's wishes. However, despite being baptized as a
Roman Catholic, Sheptytsky later decided to join the Greek Catholic
Church of his ancestry and subsequently commit his life to the advocacy
and spiritual care of the disadvantaged Ukrainian population."
In late 19" century Polish aristocratic society, such a decision did not
come without a price. Despite the fact that the Sheptytsky line was a
prominent clerical family that produced four bishops of the Greek Catholic
Church throughout the 17 and 18 centuries; young Roman's decision was
deemed as nothing short of a gross abdication of social status and betrayal
of his inherited Polish identity-accusations that would continue
throughout and after his life.1 9 Joining the Greek Catholic Basilian order
and taking the monastic name of 'Andriy," Sheptytsky would have nothing
short of a meteoric rise in the Church hierarchy-culminating in his
elevation as Metropolitan Archbishop of L'viv in 1901, thereby becoming
the de-facto head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church by age thirtysix.20 Sheptytsky would lead his Church through the very tumultuous, early
decades of the twentieth century until his death in 1944.
A church leader with a rare combination of intellectual acuity, profound
spirituality, and boundless energy; Sheptytsky's legacy for both the
Ukrainian national movement as well as his own Ukrainian Greek Catholic
Church are both indisputable as well as irreplaceable. Taking the
administrative reigns upon his elevation
as Metropolitan
of
L'viv, Sheptytsky immediately invested in the institutional structure of his
church for the improved pastoral care to better serve the needs of the
expanding size of Greek Catholic population in Eastern Galicia at the turn
of the century. Along with his focus on the spiritual needs of his flock,
Sheptytsky was also a primary proponent of education-not only in
establishing schools and reading rooms in peasant villages throughout
eastern Galicia, but also lending support for the establishment of the first
Ukrainian-language university in L'viv.2 1 In 1928, Sheptytsky would

ed.,1989).
18. For best biographical sketch on Sheptytsky's early life see CYRIL KOROLEVSKY,
METROPOLITAN ANDREW (1865-1944) (Serge Keleher trans.,1993).
19. KRAWCHUK, supra note 16, at xv.
20. Bihl, supra note 13, at 18.
21. Ann Slusarczuk,, Sheptyts'kyi in Education and Philanthropy, in MORALITY AND
REALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDREI SHEPTYTS'KYI 274 (Paul R. Magocsi ed.,1989).
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establish the L'viv Theological Academy, an institution that was the first of
its kind as the only Ukrainian-language institution of higher education.2 2
Sheptytsky's devoted fidelity to the Papacy, yet emphasis on the
importance of his church's Byzantine, Kyivan patrimony helped to solidify
the Ukrainian Greek Catholic identity as both fully 'Catholic' as well as
'Eastern'. 2 3 In so doing, Sheptytsky helped to mediate decades-old conflicts
between 'Latinizing' and 'Easternizing' pressures that had been long
present among Greek Catholics.2 4 Sheptytsky's encouragement of a
Byzantine revival among Greek Catholics at the time also extended to his
conciliatory attitude with the Orthodox. Despite historical enmity between
them, Sheptytsky sought to affirm commonality between the Orthodox and
Greek Catholics with the ultimate hope of achieving ecclesial unity.2 5 On
account of this, Sheptytsky frequently stressed that Greek Catholic leaders
have a continual mission of reconciliation with the Orthodox.2 6 Anticipating
the Second Vatican Council by almost five decades, Sheptytsky's approach
would gain him the reputation among many as a pioneer of CatholicOrthodox ecumenism. 27
Sheptytsky's philanthropic efforts were unparalleled for the cause of
Ukrainian national development-charitable assistance that spanned from
the patronization of the fine arts within Ukraine (establishment of one of the
first National Museums of Art in Ukraine) 28 to the social support of the
poorest within society. An early and enthusiastic proponent of Pope Leo
XIII's social encyclical Rerum Novarum (1893), Sheptytsky sought out
ways to implement the newly-articulated Papal teaching within the social
and political framework of Austro-Hungarian Galicia at the turn of the
century. 29 Given the economic status of the majority of Greek Catholics
under his care, Sheptytsky's implementation of the newly-articulated Papal
teaching often took on concretized, pragmatic forms such as the
establishment of farm cooperatives and credit unions that helped to alleviate
the many pressures of poverty for the landed peasant class.3 0

22. SEMINARY, ACADEMY, UNIVERSITY: THE HISTORY OF THE FOUNDING, Institute of
Church
History
Ukrainian
Catholic
University
(L'viv),
<http://www.ichistory.org/1taex/english/s ection1.html>.
23. Victor Pospishil, Sheptytskyi and LiturgicalReform, in MORALITY AND REALITY: THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDREI SHEPTYTS'KYI 201, 214, 219 (Paul R. Magocsi ed.,1989).

24.
25.

Hinka, supra note 14, at 146.
Lubomyr Husar, Sheptyts'kyi and Ecumenism, in Sheptytsky and Ecumenism, in
MORALITY AND REALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDREI SHEPTYTS'KYI 188, 194 (Paul R.
Magocsi ed.,1989).
26. METROPOLIT ANDREY SHEPTYTSKYJ, JAK BUDUVATY RIDNU KHATU 39 (L'viv:
Vydanytsvo 'Herdan' ed., 2003).
27. Husar, supra note 25, at 196.
28. Myroslava Mudrak, Sheptyts'kyi as Patron of the Arts, in MORALITY AND REALITY: THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDREI SHEPTYTS'KYI 290 (Paul R. Magocsi ed.,1989).

29.
30.

KRAWCHUK, supra note 16, at 3.
Id. at 17.
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The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 would stand as a hiatus
for Sheptytsky's leadership as he would be arrested and forcibly exiled to
Russia by the occupying Czarist army, only to return to Ukraine by 1917.
Despite regaining his freedom, the conclusion of the war would pose
daunting challenges. Most immediate concerns involved the immense
devastation and poverty in war-torn Galicia, which required even greater
philanthropic dedication. Along with providing assistance from his own
family assets, Sheptytsky used the occasion of his international pastoral
visits to Ukrainian communities in Western Europe and North America to
gather relief funds on behalf of war-wearied Galicia.3 1 Particularly pressing
was the large number of orphaned children left in the war's wake-an issue
to which Sheptytsky drew significant attention during his international
visits to North America following the war.3 2
The subsequent redrawing of the geo-political map at war's end in
accord with the mandate of the Versailles agreement would pose longerterm political challenges. With the absorption of formerly Austrian Galicia
into the newly-sovereign Second Polish Republic, the UGCC had no choice
to cooperate with a Polish government that was less than sympathetic to its
institutional status and generally hostile toward the Ukrainian national
movement.3 3 Having regained their long-desired national sovereignty,
Polish authorities maintained a seriousness about nation-building that left
little room for the expression of ethno-national minority groups, most
especially Ukrainians, within Poland's newly-defined borders. Moreover,
interwar Polish-Ukrainian relations did not have the greatest of beginnings.
In the immediacy of the war's end by 1918, Ukrainian nationalists asserted
their own national determination and established the Western Ukrainian
People's Republic on the Eastern half of Galicia-territory that was
claimed by the Second Polish Republic. A brief, but inflammatory 8-month
long war ensued from November 1918 to July 1919. Sheptytsky, as
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Metropolitan of L'viv, supported the cause of the
Western Ukrainian People's Republic and often appealed to the Wilsonian
concept of national self-determination as grounds for international
recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty.3 4 Nonetheless by July of 1919, the

31. Sirka, supra note 21, at 277.
32. A handwritten letter dated January 30, 1922 from Sheptytsky to Fr. Ponyatyshyn, a
Ukrainian Greek Catholic pastor in Chicago. After his visit to the Ukrainian Community in
Chicago, Sheptytsky thanked the priest for his assistance in gathering funds on behalf of orphans
in Galicia ". . . Once more I thank you for your efforts with church collections, I received $2,534.
83 for the orphansFalse" (Access to the letter provided courtesy of the Ukrainian National
Museum of Chicago (IL)).
33. Ryszard Torzecki, Sheptyts'kyi and Polish Society, in MORALITY AND REALITY: THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDREI SHEPTYTS'KYI 76 (Paul R. Magocsi ed.,1989).

34.

Bohdan Budorowycz, Sheptytsky and the Ukrainian National Movement after 1914, in

MORALITY AND REALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDREI SHEPTYTS'KYI 50 (Paul R. Magocsi

ed.,1989).
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weakened and poorly organized Western Ukrainian army would surrender
to the Poles.
Despite his advocacy for Ukrainian determination, Sheptytsky also
recognized the necessity of constructive cooperation with Polish
authorities.3 5 Such cooperation was far from easy as many within Polish
society maintained strong suspicion not only on account of Sheptytsky's
perceived betrayal to his inherited Polish identity, but also due to his
increasing political stature within the Ukrainian national movement in the
inter-war years.3 6 In lieu of the general absence of such charismatic
authority within the Ukrainian national movement in the inter-war years, as
well as the sharp diminishment of Ukrainian governmental representation,
Sheptytsky emerged as the de-facto 'Ethnarch' of the Ukrainian nation
within Poland during the interwar years-a role that he accepted reluctantly
and exercised with corresponding prudence.3 7 While stridently advocating
for the rights and dignities of the Ukrainian ethnic community against the
often times draconic measures of Polish authorities, Sheptytsky also
resolutely condemned several Ukrainian nationalist groups in their use of
violent methods in carrying out their political aims.3 8 Sheptytsky's
advocacy was not limited to Greek Catholics either. When Polish
authorities confiscated Ukrainian Orthodox Churches and forcibly
converted local Orthodox populations to Roman Catholicism as part of a
broader campaign of Polish nationalization among Ukrainian minorities
throughout the 1930's (Pacyfikacja), Sheptytsky vigorously condemned
governmental actions as religious persecution.3 9
Though no stranger to opposition and challenge, Sheptytsky's greatest
hardships would come in the final years of his life amid the turmoil of yet
another continental war. With the initial outbreak of World War II in
September of 1939, Eastern Galicia would be ceded to the Soviet Union on
the basis of the secretive Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Having unleashed an
unrelenting campaign against religion on Soviet Russian territory decades
before, Soviet authorities were no less eager to root out religious influences
within the newly-acquired territory. While the Greek Catholic Church was
able to maintain its de-facto legal status, Soviet authorities carried out
aggressive policies against the Church by banning Catholic religious
education as well as related civic and youth organizations.4 0 Greek Catholic
clergy were subject to crippling taxation with many priests arrested on

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Torzecki, supra note 33, at 87-92.
Id. at 80.
Budorowycz, supra note 34, at 66.
Id. at 56-57.
Krawchuk, supra note 16, at 132-133.
Bodhan Bociurkiw, Sheptytsky and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church under Soviet

Occupation, in MORALITY AND REALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ANDREI SHEPTYTS'KYI 102
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charges of 'social parasitism'.4 1 At the same time, NKVD operatives
(predecessor organ to the KGB) conducted secretive interrogations on select
Greek Catholic clergymen with the hope of gaining informants against the
Greek Catholic hierarchy.4 2 Knowing that most of what he had spent his life
building would likely meet destruction under the Soviets, Sheptytsky wrote
to Pope Pius XII, requesting the Pope's blessing for him to die as a "martyr
and confessor" for the Catholic faith, presuming Soviet persecutions would
become absolute.4 3
The initial Soviet occupation of Eastern Galicia would be short-lived as
by late June of 1941, the German army would capture L'viv and eastern
Galicia as result as part of its full-scale invasion of the Soviet Union
otherwise known as OperationBarbarossa.While a good deal of Ukrainian
populace would initially greet the arrival of Wehrmacht troops as a
welcome relief from prior Soviet oppression, the veneer of German
benevolence toward Ukrainians would soon evaporate into terror.
Remarking in a personal letter to the French prefect of the Congregregation
of Eastern Churches, Eugene Cardinal Tisserant, Sheptytsky described
Nazism as "'diabolical"' likening it to "'a pack of raving wolves fallen on a
poor people."' 4 4 In addition to instances of instantaneous violence inflicted
upon the general population, Hitler's "'final solution"' would target eastern
Galicia's significant Jewish community, which was one of the largest
concentrations in Europe. Sheptytsky, who had long cultivated in Jewish
culture and the Hebrew language, made significant efforts at opening
churches, monasteries, even his own residence to Jews seeking protection
from roving SS police. In his pastoral letter Thou Shall not Kill (Ne Ubyj),
Sheptytsky stridently and openly condemned Nazi atrocities against the
local population-something a majority of church hierarchs throughout
Europe were unwilling to do at the time.4 5 Sheptytsky's leadership through
the three, very dark years of German occupation has also been marked by
seeming contradiction. Despite heroic efforts at protecting the local Jewish
community (as well as his own) from the German terror, Sheptytsky's
welcome of German occupation in June 1941 as well as his assignment of
Greek Catholic chaplains for the Waffen-SS 'Galizien' unit would stand as
truly compromising moments. While such gestures are comprehensible in
view of the population's hellish experience under the previous Soviet
occupation, they would nonetheless serve as the pretenses for more
expansive accusations regarding Sheptytsky's 'fascist collaboration' from
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 112.
Bociurkiw, supra note 9, at 55.
Bociurkiw, supra note 40, at 104.
Excerpt of Letter Found in Serge Keleher, PASSION AND RESURRECTION: THE GREEK

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN SOVIET UKRAINE, 1939-1989 36 (L'viv: Stauropegion 1993).

45. Text of Andriy Sheptytsky "Ne Ubyj: Pastyrs'ke Poslannja Metropolita Andreja
Sheptytskoho" (21 November 1942) <http://www.cerkva.od.ua/index.php?option=com content
&task=view&id=146&Itemid=1>
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Soviet authorities.4 6 By 1944, Soviet forces re-occupied L'viv and
remained, as the modern borders of Ukraine would be determined under the
directives from the Yalta conference (1945). With ever-weakening health,
Sheptytsky died on November 1 of 1944 predicting on his deathbed not
only the mass-destruction of his Church under Soviet domination, but its
eventual revitalization.47
Sheptytsky was succeeded by his coadjutor bishop and the rector of the
L'viv Theological Seminary, Josyf Slipyj (1892-1984). Slipyj assumed
leadership as the Greek Catholic Church faced the particularly precarious
future of functioning under permanent Soviet authority. Yet despite
aggressiveness toward the Greek Catholic Church during its first occupation
(1939-1941), Soviet authorities were surprisingly conciliatory in the first
year and a half of 're-occupation'. 48 Though under the seeming pretenses of
tolerance, Soviet secret police assembled purportedly incriminating
evidence against Greek Catholic clergy and hierarchy (including the lateMetropolitan Sheptytsky), in order to accuse of collaboration with Nazicrimes. 49 At the same time, authorities were also busy in the creation of a
clerical initiative that would officially break alliance with the Papacy and
effectively merge what remained of the Greek Catholic Church with the
state-controlled Russian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate. Though
brutally repressed from the beginning of the Bolshevik revolution, the
Russian Orthodox Church was rehabilitated in 1943 under Stalin's orders in
the hope of galvanizing Russian patriotism and morale amid the war.5 0 The
NKVD-run clergy commission steadily gained priest-signatories, mostly
through methods of coercion by way of threats as well as torture.
By mid-1945, Soviet authorities launched sweeping arrests of all Greek
Catholic bishops along with Metropolitan Slipyj on drummed-up charges of
fascist-collaboration.5 2 While some bishops faced immediate execution,
others, like Slipyj, were sentenced to several years of forced labor in
Siberian exile-where many would eventually perish. In the face of torture
and death, not one Ukrainian Greek Catholic bishop renounced his loyalties
to the Holy See nor signed onto state-imposed Orthodoxy. Having
effectively decapitated the Church's hierarchy, Soviet authorities proceeded

46. See Keleher, supra note 44, at 42. Russophile and Soviet-backed Ukrainian journalist
Yaroslav Galan published the article "With Cross or Knife?" which accused Sheptytsky and
Ukrainian Greek Catholic clergy of collaboration with the Nazis. The first major accusation of
Sheptytsky following his death.
47. Ivan Patriyliak, Andrey Sheptytsky, Lion ofHalychyna, THE UKRAINIAN WEEK (May 10,
2011), http://ukrainianweek.com/History/22266.
48. Bociurkiw, supra note 9, at 78.
49. Bociurkiw, supra note 40, at 115.
50.

Nathaniel Davis, A LONG WALK TO CHURCH: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY OF RUSSIAN

ORTHODOXY 17-18 (Westview Press 2nd ed. 2003).
51. Bociurkiw, supra note 9, at 142.
52. Id. at 114, 162.

104

UNIV OF ST THOMAS JOURNAL OFLAW& PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. IX

to organize an official 'Council' held in L'viv's historic St. George's Greek

Catholic Cathedral whereby the leadership of its clergy initiative,
purporting to speak on behalf of the entire Greek Catholic Church, formally
rejected the decisions of the 1596 Union of Brest, renounced loyalties to
Rome, and 'returned' to the 'Holy Orthodox faith.' 53 Nevertheless, as none
of the Greek Catholic Bishops were present in the ratification of the
council, the L'viv Sobor was nonetheless canonically invalid.54
Immediately following the conclusion of the L'viv Council in 1946,
Soviet authorities would implement plans for the full illegalization and
liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. A plan, according to
historian Bohdan Bociurkiw, that was not only determined by Soviet
authorities at the very beginning of the war in 1939, but a characteristically
Czarist policy going back to Catherine the Great. 5 As all of the Greek
Catholic bishops had already been forcibly removed through either exiled
imprisonment or execution; all that remained was to fully implement the
newly-formed union by forcing the signatures of the remaining priests and
religious who had previously resisted signing. Priests who refused to sign
ordinarily faced the certainties of additional interrogation and torture,
imprisonment, exile, and threats of immediate or eventual execution.56 The
sweeping events of 1946 would thus begin the long, bitter road of
persecution for both clergy and faithful, who would remain suppressed on
Ukrainian territory for the next 43 years. The Stalinist years from 1946 to
1953 would prove the most brutal as the Ukrainian Church would produce,
in terms of ratio of size, more martyrs than any other local church in the
20th century.57 In his apostolic visit to Ukraine in 2001, Pope John Paul II
would beatify twenty-six martyrs from this period. Nonetheless, the total
victims from western Ukraine during this time are estimated well into the
thousands.
Despite the ferocity of the Stalinist years, the life of the Church as well
as its leadership would endure in Ukraine, if only faintly in the
underground. In the face of aggressive repression, there was nonetheless a
small minority of clergymen who had refused to sign-over loyalties to
Moscow and somehow had managed to escape immediate prosecution by
authorities. Many of these were monastics as well as other clerics who had
made the decision to continue clandestine activities to serve the Church in
the underground at great risk to themselves.59
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Stalin's death in 1953 followed by the relaxation of totalitarian
repression under Nikita Kruschev's leadership inadvertently provided the
conditions for the underground Greek Catholic Church to gain more
'breathing room' to function. While no friend of religion, Krushchev
eagerly sought opportunities to overturn the effects of Stalin's misanthropic
"'cult of personality"', thereby making reforms that would make life
generally more bearable for all Soviet citizens.6 0 Krushchev nevertheless
maintained a strident anti-religious policy, which took particular aim at the
state-controlled Russian Orthodox Church.6 1 As increasing numbers of
Russian Orthodox parishes were closed throughout western Ukraine (most
of which were Greek Catholic prior to 1946), state-imposed Orthodoxy
became a less viable alternative to illegalized Greek Catholicism. This
factor, especially combined with the return of many amnestied Greek
Catholic clergymen to western Ukraine from their terms of exiled forced
labor, ironically encouraged the continued growth and development of the
underground Greek Catholic Church-in what would soon become the
largest movement of social opposition in the Soviet Union.6 2
After his arrest in 1945, Metropolitan Josyf Slipyj (1892-1984) went on
to survive the USSR's morbid network of GULAG camps for almost
eighteen years. In January 1963, on the basis of an agreement brokered
between John F. Kennedy, Pope John XXIII, and Nikita Krushchev related
to the easing of tensions of the Cuban missile crisis during the previous
year,6 3 Slipyj was released from the Soviet prison system on the condition
that he would remain in exile, never to return to his episcopal see in
Ukraine again.6 4 By the time of his release, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic
hierarchy had been reduced to two surviving bishops (including Slipyj and
Bp. Ivan Sleziuk, underground bishop of Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine).6 5 With
the extinction of the UGCC's underground episcopacy as an ever-looming
possibility, Slipyj secretly consecrated (Blessed) Fr. Vasyl Velychovsky
(1903-1973) in his room of the Hotel Moskva in Moscow, just moments
before leaving the Soviet Union indefinitely for Rome-giving
Velychovsky explicit instruction to consecrate more bishops for the survival
of the underground church.6 6 Arriving in Rome in early 1963, Slipyj would
60. Nikita Kruschev, Speech to 2 0 th Congress of the C.P.S.U. (Feb. 24-25, 1956),
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1962-1963 (New York: Norton & Co. 1972).
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participate in the remaining sessions of the Second Vatican Council. Amid
Western curiosity concerning his release, Slipyj's biography would soon
serve as the inspiration for Morris West's 1968 film, In the Shoes of the
Fisherman.
Exhausted from the traumas of the Soviet prison system, both Soviet as
well as Vatican curial officials likely expected Slipyj to live out his
remaining years in the silent convalescence of some Roman 'seminary.'67
Those expectations, however, were soon disappointed as Slipyj assiduously
set about the task of building up his church in exile, preserving its identity,
and advocating for its rights until his death in 1984. In the immediate years
after his arrival in Rome, Slipyj established the Ukrainian Catholic
University in 1963 and completed the construction of Saint Sofia Cathedral
in 1968 on land purchased on the outskirts of Rome (Via Boccea). Saint
Sofia would become the de-facto mother-church in-exile for Ukrainian
Greek Catholics as well as a temporary cultural and institutional center for
the global diaspora. Slipyj's university in Rome, established as an exiled
successor to Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky's L'viv Theological
Academy, which was closed by Soviet authorities in 1945, would serve as
the proto-type for the establishment of L'viv's Ukrainian Catholic
University in 1994.
Though he was sworn to silence concerning his own experience in the
GULAG, Slipyj took opportunities to speak to the broader Church and
Western world concerning the life of the UGCC in the underground. Such
was the case in his 1981 lecture entitled, "The Church of the Martyrs"
delivered at an event organized by the German international charity, 'Aid to
the Church in Need.' 68 In his address, Slipyj went into significant detail in
describing the underground church's clandestine house liturgies, cellarordinations, and hidden monastic communities.6 9 While Slipyj's advocacy
for his flock behind the Iron Curtain was effective in disseminating to the
West greater information regarding Soviet persecution, his most undoubted
contribution involved the consolidation of the UGCC as a unified institution
spread across the global Ukrainian diaspora. Due to sizable waves of
Ukrainian emigration beginning in the late 19th century up through the
Second World War, Ukrainian Greek Catholicism had become more or less
an international phenomenon with several independent Metropolia and
Eparchies (Dioceses) spread across North America, Western Europe, and
Australia.
By Slipyj's release in 1963, however, the canonical structure of the
UGCC outside of Ukraine remained somewhat unclear. While Slipyj was
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recognized in the eyes of Rome as the rightful 'Metropolitan Archbishop of
L'viv," such authority did not necessarily extend to individual bishops and
eparchies in the international diaspora. Moreover, as Slipyj was indefinitely
exiled from his canonical territory (L'viv, Ukraine), the extent to his
authority among Ukrainian Greek Catholics throughout the world remained
even more ambiguous. Ukrainian Greek Catholic bishops of the global
diaspora fell instead under the authority of the Pontifical Congregration for
Oriental Churches, one of nine Roman dicasteries, which dealt directly with
contacts between the Eastern Catholic Churches and the Holy See.
Intimately aware of how close his church had come to outright extinction
on Soviet territory as well as the more subtle threats of gradual
secularization, assimilation, and marginalization of Ukrainian Greek
Catholics in the West, Slipyj sought to ensure the survival of the Church
through the establishment of the Ukrainian Church as a patriarchate under
his and his successors' authority.7 0 While it is beyond the scope or
competence of this paper to go into the depths regarding the full
significance of a patriarchal church within Eastern ecclesiology it is worth
noting that patriarchal status grants the fullest expression of ecclesial selfgovernance and that such churches, in the words of Vatican II, have "'full
right and are in duty bound to rule themselvesFalse. . ."' In such case,
Slipyj's insistence on the elevation of the Ukrainian Church to patriarchate
would at least ensure his ability to provide proper pastoral care for the
millions of Ukrainian Greek Catholics throughout the world.
Slipyj's most essential structural reform would be the establishment of
the synod of bishops for the UGCC, which organized Ukrainian Greek
Catholic bishops into one, ecclesial, governing body under patriarchal
leadership. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian synod would not be approved until
1980 with the blessing of Pope John Paul II, who was particularly
sympathetic to Slipyj's aims.7 2 Beyond mere structural reforms, Slipyj's
leadership played an acute role in uniting both Ukrainian Greek Catholic
faithful as well as the broader Ukrainian diaspora community throughout
the world. Far from remaining a prisoner of the Vatican, Slipyj made
frequent international visits to the Ukrainian diaspora throughout Western
Europe, North and South America, and Australia.
Much of Slipyj's work came into clear conflict with the Vatican's
Ostpolitik policies at the time, which sought ecumenical rapprochement
with the Russian Orthodox Church along with improved diplomatic
70.
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relations with the Kremlin. This new 'eastern policy' owed much of its
designs to the work of Agostino Cardinal Casaroli, a veteran Vatican
diplomat who would go on to serve as Vatican Secretary of State under
Pope John Paul II. Breaking with the Vatican's stalwart opposition to the
Soviet Union that was epitomized by the papacy of Pius XII, the Ostpolitik
proscribed far more conciliatory gestures toward the Soviet Union with the
significant aim of easing pressure on Catholics within the eastern bloc as
was especially the case for suppressed local churches in Lithuania,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Utterly concerned about the future viability
of Catholicism amid unbearable conditions of state oppression, Cardinal
Casaroli considered it necessary for the Church to arrive at a conciliatory
'modus vivendi' with local Communist governments so as to 'save what
could be saved' and thus ensure the continuation of the Church's life in the
proceeding years.7 3
As the Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine had already been formally
liquidated by the Kremlin in 1946, there was really nothing left for the
Ostpolitik policies to save in such case. Soviet authorities continued to
insist that the UGCC had simply ceased to exist as an institution. In light of
this, some of Paul VI's decisions with regard to improving relations with
the Russian Orthodox Church, such as his agreement to allow Ukrainian
Greek Catholics without churches of their own to receive Holy Communion
in Russian Orthodox churches, seemed only to give implicit agreement to
Moscow's aforementioned assertions.7 4 Given the specific context, Slipyj's
persistent advocacy on behalf of the persecuted UGCC only served to
reveal the mendacity of Soviet leadership and the perilous nayvet6 of the
Vatican.
Not surprisingly, Slipyj's activism also put Pope Paul VI into the
difficult situation between offering solidarity with the beleaguered
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and pursuing normalized relations with
Moscow. Paul VI, a conscientious as well as conflicted leader, sought to
recognize Slipyj's service to the Church by making him a cardinal in the
1965 consistory-making public what had already been decided 'in
pectore' by Pope Pius XII in 1949.75 However, in 1971, Paul VI refused to
grant Slipyj's request in establishing the UGCC as a patriarchate and
instead granted Slipyj the title of "Major Archbishop," a manufactured title
that had neither significance within Eastern Ecclesiology nor precedence
within the Latin Church. Exasperated with the Vatican's response during
Paul VI's reign, Slipyj continued his work yet not without vocalizing his
frustrations even to the point of declaring leadership within the Vatican
Curia to be "'blinded and lead by Russian Communists,"' who with the
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Kremlin desired "'the complete and fast disappearance of the Ukrainian
Greek Catholic Church from the earth."' 7 6
With the election of Pope John Paul II in 1978, attitudes would change
within the Vatican regarding the Ukrainian Church and Josyf Slipyj, in
particular. As the first Slav to assume the papacy and more importantly, one
who came of age as a young priest and bishop under the iron fist of
Communism in his native Poland, John Paul II bore an acute understanding
of and sympathy toward the fate of the Ukrainian Church and its
beleaguered leadership. Moreover, despite his intense Polish patriotism, the
pope did not seem to be prone to the traditional chauvinism against
Ukrainians that was fairly common among his fellow clergymen in
Poland.7 7 John Paul II's sympathies toward the UGCC would become
visibly apparent almost immediately, such as the case in the Pope's official
meeting with Slipyj on November 20, 1978, less than a month after his
papal inauguration.78
A particularly consequential gesture would come with John Paul II's
official letter to Slipyj in March of 1979, whereby he invited the Ukrainian
prelate along with his faithful to prepare for the millennium celebration of
the baptism of Kyiv-Rus' in 1988.79 Beyond mere 'well-wishing," John
Paul II was keenly aware of the significance and power that such a
commemoration could have. Having participated as a young bishop in
Cardinal Wyszynski's Great Novena in the nine years leading up to
Poland's own millennial celebrations in 1966, John Paul II witnessed firsthand the unique historical opportunity for reclaiming a genuinely Christian
past over and against the monotony of authoritarian Marxist rhetoric.so For
the Pope, the issue of '1988' not only provided the opportunity to remind
eastern Slavs currently living under an atheistic regime of their Christian
patrimony, but the particular occasion in which to raise the question of
religious rights for the still-illegal UGCC.
The Pope's 1979 letter to Slipyj also indicated the degree of his esteem
for the UGCC-not only honoring the suffering of Greek Catholics under
Soviet persecution, but explicitly lauding the 'abundant fruit' of the 1596
Union of Brest." The latter point is particularly notable as it would indicate
John Paul II's regard of the UGCC as a genuine manifestation of
ecumenical unity between East and West. Such a perspective is nonetheless
strikingly at odds with a viewpoint that would otherwise deride the 1596
Union as the mere historical accident of 'Uniatism'-a point held in
76. Josyf Slipyj, Vyslovi Patriarcha Josyfa - iz Poslan', Propovid', i Promov (1984).
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common by both the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow
Patriarchate) as well as the Vatican's council for ecumenism as evidenced
in the 1993 'Balamand Statement." 82
Josyf Slipyj died in 1984 at his residence in Rome and was buried in the
crypt of St. Sophia's Cathedral, the exiled mother-church for Ukrainian
Greek Catholics in Rome that he had commenced building two decades
before. His remains would nonetheless be transferred back to L'viv and laid
to rest in the crypt of St. George's Cathedral in 1992. Slipyj's contribution
to the UGCC, especially amid its bleakest period of existence throughout
the horrors of the twentieth century, was both invaluable and irreplaceable.
His steadfast defense of the rights for his church as well as his role in
building up its accompanying institutions undoubtedly provided an
institutional foundation for the UGCC with which to take up the work of
rebuilding the Church and related institutions in post-Soviet Ukraine less
than a decade after his death. Slipyj was succeeded by Ivan Myroslav
Lubachivsky, who previously served as the Ukrainian Catholic Archbishop
of Philadelphia. Lubachivsky fled western Ukraine as a young priest at the
end of World War II, -eventually settling in the United States. Shortly
after assuming leadership of the Ukrainian Church, he would be made
Cardinal by Pope John Paul II in 1985 and would continue to lead the
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in exile from Rome until eventually
returning to L'viv in 1991.83
By the mid-1980's, the underground Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine
had achieved relative stability as a clandestine network of bishops, priests,
religious, and devoted laity that had not only survived its worst trials, but
expanded despite its status of illegality. At the time of Archbishop Slipyj's
release in 1963, the underground church was left with only two bishops
(including Bishop Velychovsky, whom Slipyj secretly consecrated hours
prior to his departure for Rome in 1963). By 1986, the Church had eight
bishops in the underground8 4 as well as administratively primitive, albeit
functioning eparchies in both L'viv and Ivano-Frankivsk which sustained a
network of pastoral care for lay faithful, strong contacts between religious
order communities, and expanded opportunities for informal theological
study for candidates to the priesthood.15 The growing vitality of the
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underground Church was not limited only to the clerical hierarchy either.
Beginning in the 1970's, dedicated lay activists began forming human
rights groups that began articulating demands to Soviet authorities for the
recognition of religious liberties as well as using the capabilities of
Samizdat literature to circulate information to the West on state repression
of the UGCC.86
Along with other dissident groups in the Soviet Union, the ascendency
of reformist Mikhail Gorbachev to Soviet leadership by 1985 brought a
glimmer of hope for Ukrainian Greek Catholics. Although primarily aimed
at increasing governmental transparency, Gorbachev's Glasnost reforms
soon extended into the sector of freedom of press, media, and speech.
Within the first two years of taking office, Gorbachev ended the
imprisonment and exile of high-profile political dissidents, foremost among
them the renowned physicist-turned-activist, Andrei Sakharov; eventually
ending the GULAG system in its entirety by 1987.87 While the UGCC was
still a de-facto illegal religious body, Gorbachev's steady progression of
liberalizing reforms paired with his effective 'de-fanging' of the Soviet
penal apparatus further emboldened underground clergy and lay activists to
become far more visible within society. By this time, the 1988 millennial
celebrations in Ukraine provided opportunities for such visibility-such as
the case when
underground Greek Catholic bishop, Pavlo Vasylyk,
celebrated an open-air liturgy for thousands of faithful in July 1988 in
commemoration of the baptism of Kyiv-Rus' at the popular Marian shrine
of Zarvanytsya in western Ukraine." Similar open-air liturgies and
processions would continue throughout western Ukraine in the subsequent
months.89
While Communist authorities in Moscow and Kyiv would have
preferred to conveniently forget the significance of 1988, the Roman pontiff
made every effort to raise the commemorations to international and
ecumenical importance. Throughout the 1980's, John Paul II made frequent
reference to the 'gifts' of the Kyivan Christian tradition (of which the
Russian Orthodox and Ukrainian Greek Catholic churches are both heirs) as
well as the contemporary sufferings of its adherents in the 20th century
through apostolic letters (Euntes in Mundun (1988), Magnum Baptismi
Donum (1988)), public addresses, liturgies, and even one encyclical
(Slavorum Apostoli)(1985). For Papal biographer and author George
Weigel, such persistence demonstrated the political deftness that allowed
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Pope John Paul II to effectively protect the genuinely Christian significance
of the 1988 commemorations from possible manipulation by Soviet
authorities.9 0 Capitalizing on a historic moment, John Paul II initiated
correspondence with Mikhail Gorbachev in early June of 1988 through a
hand-written letter in which the Pope invited the Soviet chairman to
consider the possibility of closer diplomatic ties between the USSR and
Holy See so as to better address the "'situation of the Catholic Church in
the USSR."'9 1
In the end, John Paul II's persistence would pay-off. On December 1,
1988, the Pope and the Soviet chairman would meet for the first time in the
Vatican-the first and only encounter between a Pope and Soviet leader.
While the meeting was characterized by mutual cordiality as well as
exuberance for its implications, the Pope did not shy away from the issue of
legalization for the underground UGCC.9 2 While indirectly alluding to the
UGCC in his formal address,9 3 the Pope directly and adamantly asserted the
need for religious liberty for Ukrainian Greek Catholics as well as othersreminding Gorbachev of past treaties and agreements in which the Soviet
government had promised to secure such civil rights.9 4 Within hours of the
historic meeting, the head of the Council for Religious Affairs of the
Ukrainian SSR, Mykola Kolesnyk, announced legal recognition of the
UGCC.9 5 If, as Gorbachev once asserted during a 1987 Soviet Central
Committee meeting, that his liberalizing reforms set the Soviet machine on
a trajectory of having "'nowhere to retreat,"' then granting legal recognition
to the largest of its underground dissident organizations (not to mention
churches) was an inevitable reality.9 6 Nevertheless, the solicitude of Pope
John Paul II must be credited in hastening such inevitability.
The final declaration of legal recognition for the UGCC's existence
only lowered the proverbial 'flood gate' to what was already a steady reappearance of the underground Church within western Ukraine. Along with
this was the massive return of the local population to the Greek Catholic
Church in western Ukraine most of whom were from families who were
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Greek Catholic prior to the UGCC's dissolution in 1946. Significant among
this number of 're-verts' were many priests who had received theological
education as well as ordination within the Russian Orthodox Church, but
who nonetheless felt compelled to incardinate into the Greek Catholic
Church.9 7 Despite the fact that the Kremlin may have acquiesced to the
demands for legal status of the Greek Catholic Church, the leadership of the
Russian Orthodox-Moscow Patriarchate did not. The re-emergence of the
underground Church paired with the mass return of the majority of churchgoing western Ukrainians to Greek Catholicism raised the question of
property ownership. As the significant majority of the functioning 'Moscow
Patriarchate Orthodox Churches' in western Ukraine were previously Greek
Catholic, the UGCC understandably insisted on the return of its churches.
From the Greek Catholic perspective, the Kremlin's concession to legally
recognize the UGCC, however good, was essentially a moot point without
any reference to the return of assets that were liquidated by the Soviet
government four decades prior. The leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate
strongly objected to any such suggestion and had obvious reasons for doing
so. Not only were fifty percent of all Russian Orthodox parishes throughout
the USSR registered in Ukraine as a whole,9 8 western Ukraine had one of
the highest levels of religious adherence among all Soviet countries.9 9
Throughout 1990, bitter conflicts ensued throughout western Ukraine as
Greek Catholic and Orthodox faithful contested such ownership rights. One
of the most notable cases involved the return of L'viv's St. George's
Cathedral, the historic mother-church of the UGCC since the 18th century,
in August of 1990. Despite the fact that Greek Catholics had gained
property rights for the cathedral compound from L'viv municipal and
regional authorities, Russian Orthodox Bishop Andrei Horak refused to
forfeit the Cathedral-resulting in a mass demonstration of over 30,000
Greek Catholics on St. George's hill to reclaim the territory.10 0 Bishop
Volodymyr Sterniuk, the underground Greek Catholic bishop of L'viv,
intervened to urge the demonstrators to be peaceful in their efforts that
would eventually succeed in re-acquiring the Cathedral.10 1
The Russian Orthodox-Greek Catholic conflicts also bore ecumenical
implications outside of Ukraine as well-inciting the Vatican to initiate
special meetings in Moscow with Russian Orthodox leadership to negotiate
terms of resolution.1 0 2 While the bitterest of conflicts over church-property
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rights would eventually somewhat subside, enmity between the Ukrainian
Greek Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches would not. In the
perspective of the Moscow Patriarchate, the UGCC's reclamation of its
church properties in western Ukraine would constitute the first of
continuing infringements upon its canonical territory.
On March 30, 1991, the UGCC's exiled head, Ivan Myroslav Cardinal
Lubachivsky, returned to Ukraine and took permanent residence in the
country. In a moving ceremony the following day, Lubachivsky officially
took possession of St. George's Cathedral in L'viv.1 0 3Despite his shy and
retiring demeanor, Lubachivsky would nonetheless take on the gargantuan
task of building-up the Church's extremely primitive infrastructure as well
as defining its role within the post-Soviet political order of independent
Ukraine. In 1992, Lubachivsky organized and lead the first synod of Greek
Catholic bishops on Ukrainian territory and by 1994, had established four
new eparchies within the country.1 04 Along with providing the necessary
administrative structure to the Church, there was the question of vocations
to the priesthood, which posed both tremendous opportunity as well as
challenge. While the number of seminarian candidates dramatically swelled
(Lubachivsky reported there were over one thousand seminarians in
Ukraine in a 1994 interview),"os the Church had neither the logistics nor the
personnel to train them.1 06 In the absence of necessary funding to build new
seminaries, bishops often resorted to purchasing abandoned Soviet-era
schools and military barracks to house their students.1 0 7 As formal
theological education was a luxury unavailable to Soviet citizens, let alone
for priests and religious in the underground, the Church was left to rely on
international assistance from educated clergyman and academics from
abroad, a majority of whom were from the Ukrainian diaspora, to lead the
UGCC's fledgling social apostolates and institutions. Chief among these
institutions was the Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU) in L'viv, which
was founded in 1994 by Ukrainian-American historian, Borys Gudziak.
Gudziak, who would be ordained a priest in 1998 and later consecrated a
bishop in 2012, regarded the establishment of the university as a
continuation of Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky's vision of a Ukrainian
Greek Catholic institution of higher education and research.10 s Since its
establishment, the Ukrainian Catholic University has maintained the pride

103. Patriarkhat 6 (246) (June 1991) pp 5-6.
104. "Intervju Patriarkha Myroslava-Ivana dlja presy z nahody tretoji richnytsi povorotu v
Ukrajinu"Patriarkhat 7-8(283-284) July-August 1994 p 4.
105. Id.
106. Interview with David Nazar SJ, Jesuit Provincial of Ukraine, in""Jesuit Voices (Apr. 29,
2008).
107. Interview with Lubomyr Cardinal Husar, (May 2014).
108. Borys Gudziak, Speech for the Inauguration of the Ukrainian Catholic University (June
26, 2002).

No. 1]

Pro Deo Et Patria

115

of place as the first and only Catholic University in the former Soviet
Union.
Beyond rebuilding its structure and institutions, a no less important task
for UGCC leadership involved defining the church's role within the postSoviet political order. To that end, Cardinal Lubachivsky made efforts to
both dialog as well as cooperate with presidential and parliamentary
leadership in Kyiv-such as addressing Ukraine's parliament (Verkhovna
Rada) in 1993 concerning the need to come to greater understanding of the
nature of the Church's distinct independence from governmental
authority.1 0 9 Given the Soviet legacy of church-state relations-a paradigm
that was undoubtedly engrained in the mentalities of secular and church
authorities alike, such efforts of engagement between both sides proved
necessary. The idea of an independent church outside of the customary,
regulatory controls of the state was something to which many state
bureaucrats who had come of age in the Communist system, were
unaccustomed. Likewise, for many clergymen of the same generation who
lived through the Church's 'defensive crouch' of underground existence,
the idea of a pro-active church on the 'public square' proved equally
foreign. As Lubomyr Cardinal Husar would later put it, the first decade(s)
of the UGCC's existence in post-Soviet Ukraine would involve the Church
and State simply "'getting used to one another."' 110
Intensified social engagement within post-Soviet Ukrainian society
would characterize the leadership of Lubomyr Husar, who would succeed
Lubachivsky as head of the Church in 2001. Though born in L'viv in 1933,
Husar's family would flee Ukraine and eventually settle in the United States
where he would be ordained a priest. After serving as a parish priest as well
as an academic theologian, Husar entered the Studite monastic order in
Rome as well as collaborated with the then-exiled church head, Josyf
Cardinal Slipyj. Following the Soviet dissolution, Husar permanently took
up residence in Ukraine in 1993 until his elevation as head of the church.1
Known for his deeply reflective wisdom, simplicity, and personal candor;
Husar became well-respected throughout Ukraine and abroad.1 1 2
A firm advocate of ecumenism, Husar sought out opportunities for
improved relations with Ukraine's Orthodox communities-even proposing
the somewhat controversial idea that the UGCC maintain 'dual
communion' between Rome and Constantinople.1 13 Strongly encouraging of

109. Myroslav Ivan Lubachivsky "Slovo Patrijarkha Myroslava-Ivana Do Narodnikh
Deputativ Verkhovnoji Rady Ukrainy" Patriarkhat 9(49) September 1991.
110. Husar, supra note 107.
111. Borys Gudziak, "Foreword" in Antoine Arjakovsky, Conversations with Lubomyr
Husar (2007) 7-9, 12-14.
112. American journalist and Vatican expert John Allen slotted Cardinal Husar as a top
'Papibile' in his 2002 Conclave: The Politics, Personalities, and Process of the Next Papal
Election (Image 2002) 231 pgs.
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post-Soviet Ukraine's democracy-building efforts, Husar did not shy away
from leveling acute criticism regarding the many dysfunctions within postCommunist society-even admitting one time that it would take generations
formed (and maltreated) within the Communist system to eventually 'die
out' before any genuine renewal were to take place.1 1 4 Under Husar's
leadership, the UGCC continued its remarkable growth and development
within the country-not only reclaiming
predominance within its
traditional heartland of western Ukraine, but also experiencing marked
growth throughout the entirety of the country.
In accord with Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky's vision, UGCC
leadership established missionary exarchates in the eastern and southern
oblasts of Ukraine (Kharkiv, Donetsk, Odessa, Crimea) by the early
2000's-territory that, despite the preponderance of Orthodoxy, had borne
the effects of Soviet atheism considerably more so than in the west of the
country. The development of the UGCC within these regions also coincided
with the Ukrainian Synod of Bishops' decision to move the seat of the
UGCC from L'viv to Kyiv in 2004-beginning the construction of the
Patriarchal Cathedral of the Resurrection that was to be located on Kyiv's
left bank along the historic Dniper river."' Such decisions did not come
without controversy. In a 2003 interview for the Italian publication 30
Giorni, Metropolitan Kyrill Gundjaev of Smolensk (later elected as
Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2008), decried the moves as
'expansionist' and accused the UGCC of attempting to revive "an
ecclesiology of the time of the Crusades."1 1 6 The Holy Synod of the Russian
Church took Kyrill's accusation one step further by accusing the Vatican of
a "strategic intention of expansion" into traditional Orthodox territory.117
Husar defended the UGCC's decision on both historical as well as pastoral
grounds-citing that Kyiv had once served as the center of Greek Catholic
life prior to its suppression under the Czarist government and that increased
numbers of Ukrainian Greek Catholic faithful living in Central and Eastern
Ukraine, largely due to Soviet-era forced relocations, required greater
pastoral accessibility for UGCC leadership." Nonetheless the continued
development of the UGCC would further exacerbate the already frayed
relations with the Russian Orthodox Church and eventually emerge as an
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ineluctable sticking point in broader Rome-Moscow relations in the
following years.
Despite mounting tensions with the Russian Orthodox, Cardinal Husar
had gained a respect across Ukraine that was unparalleled by any other
Church leader in the country.119 In particular, the events surrounding the
2004-2005 'Orange Revolution' provided a unique manifestation of such
moral authority. As outrage sparked the country due to election fraud,
Husar along with the rest of UGCC hierarchy vocally asserted that faithful
had the moral and civic obligation to expect fair and honest procedures
from state authorities. At the same time, however, UGCC hierarchy (and
clergy) strictly abstained from offering endorsements of any candidate or
political party.12 0 As thousands of citizens gathered on Kyiv's Independence
Square to vocalize their demands for an official recount, Greek Catholic
clergy were among the most visible religious representatives who
accompanied demonstrators. The eventual victory of the western-leaning
Viktor Yushchenko stood as a favorable moment for the Greek Catholic
Church in Ukraine as Yushchenko was particularly well-disposed toward
the work of the church in post-Soviet society-most particularly in the
example of L'viv's Ukrainian Catholic University.1 2 1
Though considered as a victory in the cause of democratic process, the
Orange Revolution of 2004-2005 also revealed the latent complexities
within Ukraine's political and religious landscape. In the run-up to the
elections in 2004, Viktor Yanukovych received the official endorsement of
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate, whose clergy also
accompanied smaller, counter-protests on Kyiv's city square.12 2 Moreover,
the religious overlay of what had long been understood as Ukraine's
political cleavage between 'east' and 'west' demonstrated stark, albeit,
unsurprising correlations. As the western-leaning Viktor Yushchenko
received his highest approval from oblasts in western Ukraine with the
highest proportion of Greek Catholics per population, Viktor Yanukovych
maintained the majority of his support in the far eastern regions of the
country, predominated by the Moscow Patriarchate Church.
With the possibility of being perceived as a politically partisan
institution, UGCC hierarchy faced a delicate balancing act of maintaining
an active presence within the 'public square' while at the same time
fastidiously upholding its political neutrality. For a country where the
state's co-optation of the church was considered 'business as usual," such a
119. Borys Gudziak "Foreword" in Antoine Arjakovsy Conversations with Lubomyr Cardinal
Husar: Toward a Post-Confessional Christianity (L'viv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press
2007) p. 15.
120. Ibid pg. 135.
121. "Ukraine's president visits Ukrainian Catholic University in L'viv" Ukrainian Catholic
University -News (3 June 2009) <http://ucu.edu.ua/eng/news/176/>.
122. "Yanukovych Has Moscow Patriarchate On His Side" Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 1
Issue 127 (November 14, 2004).
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task was easier said than done. Yet for Husar, it was precisely the necessity
to undo such 'totalitarian' mentality that dictated the UGCC's rules of
engagement in the post-Soviet context. For Husar, the Church bore an
explicit obligation to encourage virtue and excoriate vice within the
political realm, but could not trivialize itself as a mere instrument of the
state through potentially compromising political alliances.1 2 3 Such
qualifications would nonetheless be important in the proceeding years.
Due to a variety of factors, not least the pressures of the global financial
crisis in 2008, Yushchenko's 'Orange' political coalition would eventually
dissolve, leaving his European-style political and economic reforms
stillborn. Out of clear disappointment with Yushchenko's failed attempts at
westernization, Yushchenko's 2004 challenger, Viktor Yanukovych, made
significant political gains on a platform that stressed a return to stability and
centralization. The election of Viktor Yanukovych to the presidency in
early 2010 began the eventual deterioration in relations between the UGCC
and the Ukrainian government.By May of 2010, Fr. Borys Gudziak, the
rector of the Ukrainian Catholic University of L'viv reported a shake-down
from agents of the Ukrainian Security Services (SBU-Sluzhba Bezpeka
Ukrainy-the Ukrainian successor to the KGB) in an attempt to intimidate
him into reigning-in student-led protests against the Yanukovych
government.1 2 4 Gudziak politely refused and shrewdly sent his
memorandum of the encounter to editors of the Economist magazine, who
published it in a later week's edition. While international attention likely
helped to foil coercive attempts in this case, such incident nonetheless stood
as an early litmus test of the Yanukovych government's willingness to
resort to Soviet-style heavy-handedness when it felt necessary.
Within an atmosphere of mounting tension, the Ukrainian Synod of
Bishops elected Sviatoslav Shevchuk as head of the UGCC in March of
2011 to succeed Lubomyr Cardinal Husar who resigned due to ailing
health. At just forty years old at the time of his elevation, Shevchuk was the
youngest bishop of the UGCC and one of the youngest senior clerics in the
global Church. Born into a family that was active in the Soviet-era
underground Church, Shevchuk was ordained to the priesthood in 1994.125
He would later go on to attain his doctorate in Moral Theology from the
Angelicum in Rome in 2000, becoming the first native-born Ukrainian
Greek Catholic cleric to be awarded such a degree in the Church's postSoviet existence. Shevchuk was consecrated a bishop in 2009 and
summarily appointed to administer the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Eparchy
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of Buenos Aires (Argentina), where he incidentally forged a strong
friendship with then-Archbishop Jorge Cardinal Bergolgio. Considered as a
dynamic pastor, a precocious scholar, and a gifted polyglot (Shevchuk is
said to be fluent in six other languages in addition to his native Ukrainian);
Shevchuk's elevation as head of the UGCC stood as a confirmation of his
church's remarkable revitalization in the post-Soviet period.
While the relationship between the Yanukovych government and the
UGCC would be relatively uneventful for Shevchuk's first years of
leadership, the course of events by late 2013 and 2014 would bring about
confrontation with state authorities to degrees not seen since the Soviet-era.
On November 22, 2013, just a week before signing his long-promised
European Association agreement, President Viktor Yanukovych,
undoubtedly intimidated by the Moscow strong-arming, backed out of the
agreement.1 2 6 In protest, students of the Ukrainian Catholic University
organized demonstrations in L'viv that would be soon followed-up by much
larger student gatherings in Kyiv. Kyiv's Independence Square, known in
Ukrainian as 'Maidan Nezalezhnosti' soon became known as the
'Euromaidan," a title that eventually came to stand for the entire
movement. Just a week after protests began, brutal beatings of student
demonstrators at the hands of Ukrainian special police (BERKUT) ignited
what had originated as a student movement into a nation-wide event that
gripped the entire country. In the proceeding weeks, increasing numbers of
citizens came by the thousands to Kyiv-eventually turning Independence
Square into a semi-permanent stronghold of large, canvas field tents
cordoned off by ad-hoc protective walls of street rubble and old tires. At the
same time, the increasing willingness of government authorities to resort to
reminiscently Soviet-style police crackdowns, intimidation tactics, secretive
abductions, and even contracted killings,127 made it ever more apparent that
the civil struggle on Kyiv's streets constituted, in the words of Bishop
Borys Gudziak, a "Maidan of Dignity" above all else.1 2 8
Much like the Orange Revolution before it, Greek Catholic clergymen
were among the first and most visibly present religious leaders on the
Maidan. While clergymen constructed make-shift chapels and could be seen
mingled among protesters with their indicative stoles worn over heavy
winter down jackets, religious observance frequently took center stage as
priests and bishops punctuated time by corporate prayers, celebration of
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Divine Liturgy, and the recitation of the Rosary. Yet far from being an
exclusively religious movement, such traditional liturgical observances
often shared the stage with political activists as well as contemporary
Ukrainian rock and roll bands-making the Maidan an eclectic, albeit,
seamless m6lange of sacred and secular that was most likely initially jarring
to most Western observers. While UGCC clergy were initially most vocal
and pro-active, the Maidan very quickly became robustly ecumenical with
the strong representation of Orthodox and Protestant clergyman as well. As
heated stand-offs between demonstrators and police gradually evolved into
more frequently violent, even fatal confrontations; clergymen willingly
placed themselves among demonstrators, sometimes in the direct line of
fire, to assume the role of impromptu peace-keepers.
The apparent 'activism' of UGCC clergy on the Maidan was not lost on
the Yanukovych government. In early January of 2014, Major Archbishop
Shevchuk received a letter from the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture
threatening the repeal of the legal status of the UGCC if its clergy continued
to lead public prayers outside of 'designated' areas for such religious
observance.1 2 9 For Church leaders and faithful alike, such a gesture evoked
the disturbing memories of Ukraine's Stalinist past-the legacy of which
had never been fully extirpated even after two and a half decades of
independence. Refusing to bend to state pressure, Shevchuk publicly urged
state authorities to desist from such measures lest the "'current sociopolitical crisis"' involve "'the religious sphere as well."'1 3 0
While successfully withstanding such pressures, the censure of the
UGCC along the aforementioned grounds brought the concern of its alleged
political partisanship once more into further attention. While strenuously
defending the right of priests to "pray wherever his faithful are,"
Archbishop Shevchuk nevertheless explained the UGCC's role within the
course of events with a sense of caution and balance.1 3 1 Disabusing any
notion that would associate the UGCC as a political 'agent' within the
movement, Shevchuk asserted, along with Cardinal Husar a decade before
him, that the Church's priority remained in pastoral support of its faithfulemphasizing the striking image of the Church 'following' her people to the
Maidan.1 3 2 Deflecting the accusation that the UGCC's activity within the
Maidan had constituted part of a larger ethno-religious conflict of 'Catholic
West' versus 'Orthodox East," Shevchuk stressed the Church's support of
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the exclusively 'civil' nature of the Maidan, which was based upon
universal values of liberty, human dignity, and disdain for corruption
among other values.1 33 Because the UGCC built its agenda on such values,
it was better able to encourage and participate in a genuinely ecumenical
social movement among different religious institutions throughout Ukraine,
who worked together to contribute to Ukraine's otherwise underdeveloped
civil society.134
Following the ouster of president Yanukovych, UGCC leadership as
well as that of Kyiv's interim government would face the new challenge of
what historian Timothy Snyder would term as Russia's "'Haze of
Propaganda."' 1 3 5 As Russian accusations of latent-fascism against the
Maidan movement and the Kyiv interim-government became more
commonplace, the UGCC was often implicated. In an early and prominent
example, Vladimir Putin used the opportunity of a January 28, 2014 address
in Brussels to blame the influence of 'racist and anti-semitic Uniate priests'
for the upheaval in Kyiv.13 ' Unfortunately, the leadership of the Russian
Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) not only took the same position,
but intensified the rhetoric. While the Russian Patriarch, Kyrill (Gundjaev)
offered relatively few comments concerning the Ukrainian crisis, the
majority of commentary has been left to Metropolitan Hilarion Alfaeyev,
the head of the Department of External Church Relations for the Moscow
Patriarchate. In an April 2014 interview, Hilarion went to the extent of
accusing the UGCC of mounting a "'crusade"' against Orthodoxy in
Ukraine.1 3 7 As an ecumenical participant in the Synod of Bishops on the
Family held in October of 2014 at the Vatican, the Metropolitan used the
occasion of his official address not only to deride the UGCC for its alleged
political partisanship in Kyiv's Maidan movement but even suggested that
its very existence posed insurmountable obstacles to the Catholic-Orthodox
dialogue.13 8 Vatican officials offered no response to Hilarion's charges that
nonetheless indicated one of the lowest points in Rome-Moscow
ecumenical relations since the opening of the Second Vatican Council.
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In a far more immediate sense, the commentary of the Moscow
Patriarchate is particularly disconcerting given the current status of the
UGCC within both Russian-Annexed Crimea as well as the war-torn
Donbas where Moscow-backed authorities have designated Russian
Orthodoxy as the official religion. Following the annexation of the
Crimean peninsula in March of 2014, there were several reported incidents
of harassment against Greek Catholic clergy-including one abduction and
interrogation of a Greek Catholic priest from Simferopol.1 3 9 Beyond
intimidation tactics, the UGCC faces paralyzing legal constraints on its very
existence as self-proclaimed Crimean authorities required all religious
bodies to re-register for legal protection according to Russian law by the
end of 2014. As it is not an officially recognized religious body under
Russian law, it was impossible for the UGCC to complete such reregistration thus making it a de-facto illegal religious body on the Crimean
peninsula as of January 2015.140
While no such legal constraints have been enforced on UGCC churches
within the separatist-backed regions of the Donbass
(Donetsk and
Luhansk) to date, far many more incidences of acute aggression against
Greek Catholic Clergy, paired with the indiscriminate violence of warfare,
have made the effects on the Church all the more devastating. Greek
Catholic priests reported frequent threats, abductions, and in one case,
torture at the hands of rebel fighters in the area.14 1 The intensity of military
conflict within the region over the past year, which has claimed more than
6,000 lives, eventually forced the current Greek Catholic Bishop of
Donetsk, Stepan Meniok, to abandon his residence in Donetsk which, along
with the Greek Catholic Cathedral and Chancery, were vandalized and
looted by separatist fighters.14 2
Instances of harassment have not been directed solely toward Greek
Catholics either as both Roman Catholic as well as Protestant communities
within the region have reported significant instances of violent harassment
over the past year. Archbishop Thomas Gullickson, the American-born
Papal nuncio to Ukraine has been solicitous in drawing attention to the
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religious persecution over the past months. In Gullickson's estimation, the
current pressures against Catholics in both Crimea as well as the Donbas
place the future existence of Catholicism of both Latin and Greek rites into
serious jeopardy in the coming years.14 3 Given the relatively small
population of both Roman and Ukrainian Greek Catholics within these
regions, such concerns are not unwarranted. Whether or not there will be
the opportunity to re-build Catholic communities in the Donbas in the years
ahead, the task of rebuilding after the devastation wrought from the past
year of warfare will easily require decades of work.
When taking into consideration its long-term as well as contemporary
history, it is reasonable to say the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, like
Ukraine, is at a significant 'crossroads' in its existence. Such is the case
with regard to its own maturity and development as a church in the postSoviet era. The remarkable recovery and renewal of the UGCC, an
institution once doomed for annihilation, from its underground existence to
its present-day status is nothing short of miraculous. The most telling sign
of such Post-Soviet renewal can be found in the person of its current head,
Major Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk, whose combination of intellectual,
pastoral, and organizational dynamism paired with his relative youth will
make the UGCC a force to be reckoned with both in Ukraine, as well as the
broader Catholic Church. Presuming his reception of the Cardinalate within
the next five years, Shevchuk would be on pace to emerge as one of the
global Church's most senior clerics while still in his prime. In this regard,
the UGCC has reached a point of development and stability unprecedented
in its history.
The UGCC's contemporary development paired with the current
confrontation between Russia and Ukraine has nonetheless brought the
issue of Rome-Moscow ecumenical relations to the fore. The current
discourse from the Russian Orthodox leadership, which considers the
UGCC as an existential obstacle to further ecumenical relations, seems to
have laid down an ultimatum. While Rome's acquiescence to Moscow's
demands in the past may have kept such relations nominally afloat, it often
came at the expense of the UGCC, which was often struggling for its
existence. Nonetheless, the contemporary status and relative stability of the
UGCC would make it far too formidable of an entity to ignore. It would
seem therefore, that contemporary Rome-Moscow ecumenical relations, at
least on the level of hierarchical leadership, have reached an indefinite
impasse that is not likely to be moved in subsequent years.
Lastly, there is the question of the role of the UGCC within the national
life of contemporary Ukraine. Long-term as well as recent history has only
reiterated the Greek Catholic Church's closeness to the national aspirations
of the Ukrainian people. As a mainline church, the UGCC still retains an
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overwhelming moral authority within Ukrainian society that is otherwise
unfathomable for the Church in other parts of Europe-a fact demonstrated
in both the Orange Revolution and the Maidan movement respectively.
Assuming Ukraine's movement toward Europe is inevitable, it remains to
be seen as to how the UGCC, despite its favorable legacy and youthful
leadership, will encounter a European-style secularism that is both apathetic
as well as traditionally anti-clerical. Such question shall nonetheless be for
posterity to judge.

